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AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1978
ROBERT A. JOHNSON*
MARILYN C. O'LEARY**

INTRODUCTION***

In this article, the authors intend to provide guidance to New Mexico
practitioners by discussing bankruptcy court decisions' which construed
sections 361 and 3622 of the Bankruptcy Code. 3 To that end, the authors
*A.B., Yale University; L.L.B., Harvard Law School; United States Bankruptcy Judge, District
of New Mexico, 1978-1981; currently Director, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A.,
Albuquerque, New Mexico.
**B.A., St. Mary's College; M.A. & J.D., University of New Mexico; former law clerk, New
Mexico Bankruptcy Court; currently Assistant Commission Counsel, New Mexico Public Service
Commission.
***On June 28, 1982, the United States Supreme Court held the grant of jurisdiction to bankruptcy
judges in the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 unconstitutional. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., - U.S.-., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982). While there is some disagreement over exactly
which provisions of the law were invalidated by that opinion, the Judicial Conference of the United
States issued a rule to be adopted by local federal courts which it believes will solve the jurisdiction
infirmity until Congress enacts remedial legislation or until March 31, 1984 (the end of the so-called
transition period), whichever comes first. The New Mexico Federal District Judges adopted that rule
as N.M. Fed. Dist. Ct. R. 31 (as amended), effective December 25, 1982. While the rule affects
the bankruptcy court in very substantial ways, the basic workings of the automatic stay (and thus
this article) are unaffected by the Rule.
Serious discussion of the jurisdiction problem and Rule 31 would require a separate article. The
authors have noted one textual reference which they believe may have been brought into question
by the Marathon decision. Any other doubtful sections were deleted. It is the authors' speculation
and expectation that construction of the Rule or enactment of legislation to remedy the jurisdictional
problem will not affect the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
1. The authors have cited appropriate published New Mexico decisions where available; however,
many New Mexico decisions are unpublished and are not easily retrievable. Therefore, the authors
have also cited opinions from other jurisdictions which are in accord with New Mexico decisions
and practices. The authors also frequently cite legislative history because it is a useful tool in
construing this relatively new statute. Even when the legislative history is entirely clear, however,
reliance on such history is no substitute for reading the statute. See, e.g., the conflict between the
text of 11 U.S.C. § 303(h) (Supp. V 1981), and its legislative history.
2. 11 U.S.C. §361 (Supp. V 1981) provides as follows:
When adequate protection is required under section 362, 363, or 364 of this title
[11 U.S.C. § 362, 363, or 364] of an interest of an entity in property, such adequate
protection may be provided by(1) requiring the trustee to make periodic cash payments to such entity, to
the extent that the stay under section 362 or this title [11 U.S.C. § 362],
use, sale, or lease under section 363 of this title [11 U.S.C. § 363], or any
grant of a lien under section 364 of this title [11 U.S.C. § 364] results in
a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such property;
(2) providing to such entity an additional or replacement lien to the extent
that such stay, use, sale, lease, or grant results in a decrease in the value
of such entity's interest in such property; or
(3) granting such other relief, other than entitling such entity to compen-
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sation allowable under section 503(b)(1) of this title [I I U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)]
as an administrative expense, as will result in the realization by such entity
of the indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property.
11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. V 1981) provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section
301, 302, or 303 of this title [11 U.S.C. § 301, 302, or 303] operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against
the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title [11 U.S.C. §§ I et seq.], or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title [II U.S.C. §8 I et seq.];
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title
[11 U.S.C. §§ I et seq.];
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 U.S.C. §§ I et seq.];
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title [11 U.S.C. § 1 et
seq.];
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title [11 U.S.C. §§ I et seq.] against any
claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title [II U.S.C.
§301, 302, or 303] does not operate as a stay(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor;
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of the estate;
(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect an interest in
property to the extent that the trustee's rights and powers are subject to such
perfection under section 546(b) of this title [11 U.S.C. § 546(b)];
(4) under subsection (a)(l) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such
governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a
governmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(6) under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of any mutual debt
and claim that are commodity futures contracts, forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, warrants, rights to purchase or sell
commodity futures contracts or securities, or options to purchase or sell
commodities or securities;
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement of any action
by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage
deed of trust in any case in which the mortgage or deed of trust held by
said Secretary is insured or was formerly insured under the National Housing
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Act and covers property, or combinations of property, consisting of five or
more living units; or
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the debtor by a
governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this section(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under subsection (a) of
this section continues until such property is no longer property of the estate;
and
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section continues
until the earliest of(A) the time the case is closed;
(B) the time the case is dismissed; and
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title [11 U.S.C.
§§ 701 et seq.] concerning an individual or a case under chapter 9,
11, or 13 of this title [11 U.S.C. §§901 et seq., 1101 et seq., or
1301 et seq.], the time a discharge is granted or denied.
(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annuling, modifying or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section for relief from
the stay of any action against property of the estate under subsection (a) of this
section, such stay is terminated with respect to the party in interest making such
request, unless the court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in
effect pending, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination under subsection
(d) of this section. A hearing under this subsection may be a preliminary hearing,
or may be consolidated with the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section.
If the hearing under this subsection is a preliminary hearing(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the party opposing relief from such stay will prevail at the
final hearing under subsection (d) of this section; and
(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days after such
preliminary hearing.
(f) The court, without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the stay provided
under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to prevent irreparable damage
to the interest of an entity in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before
there is an opportunity for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this
section.
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section concerning relief from
the stay of any act under subsection (a) of this section(I) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of
the debtor's equity in property; and
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on all other issues.
3. 11 U.S.C. 88 101 to 151326 (Supp. V 1981) [hereinafter referred to as "the Code"]. Pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. V 1981), the Code sections with numbers 100, 300, or 500 are generally
applicable throughout the Code. Sections with numbers of 700 are applicable only to Chapter 7,
which deals with liquidation; those with numbers of 1100 are applicable to Chapter 11, aptly titled
Reorganization; and those in the 1300 series apply to what is now rather grandly titled "Adjustments
of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income." The latter chapter used to be called merely "Wage
Earner."
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discuss the importance of the automatic stay provisions of the Code,
explaining these provisions and their relationship to other Code provisions. Then, the article delineates which creditor actions are and are not
stayed, as well as the duration of the stay. The authors follow with an
explanation of relief from the stay. They set out other applicable powers
of the bankruptcy court, the time limits within which it must render its
decision, and the elements a creditor must prove in a hearing for relief
from the stay. Finally, the authors examine the removal provisions and
the penalties for violation of the stay.
The bankruptcy court is bound only to follow appellate decisions of
its own circuit, and because of the relatively short time the Code has
been in effect, these decisions are rare. Precedential value of decisions
of coordinate courts is ordinarily limited, and their persuasiveness depends
on the confidence one bankruptcy judge has in the views of another. Like
the Bible, bankruptcy court decisions can be found to support any idiosyncratic view.4 The researcher must take care not to conclude too quickly
that one case found in support of a particular point of view will be
convincing to the court. Despite the lack of precedential value of bankruptcy court decisions, however, publication of them provides a useful
forum for the exchange of ideas and elucidation of this recent and complex
statute.

THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are among the
most important in the Code.' Once a petition in bankruptcy has been
filed, the automatic stay of proceedings assures the debtor a breathing
space in which to take stock of assets and assess liabilities free from the
pressure of anxious creditors. The stay prevents piecemeal dismantling
of the estate and guarantees creditors that no one in their same position
will receive proportionately more return on an extension of credit than
will they. Once the stay is in effect and the assets have been gathered,
the trustee can begin the orderly distribution of the estate. The purpose
4. See, e.g., Coleman Am. Cos. v. The Littleton Nat'l Bank (In re Coleman Am. Companies &
Properties), 8 Bankr. 384 (Bankr. D.Kan. 1981); Griffith v. Realty Executives (In re Griffith), 6
Bankr. 753 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980). Both cases reached results contrary to those of almost all other
courts on their respective issues.
5. Other articles on the automatic stay which might be of interest to the reader include Kennedy,
Automatic Stay Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 Mich. J.L. Ref. 3 (1978); Martin, Relieffrom
Automatic Stay Under the Bankruptcy Code, 9 Colo. Law. 1288 (1980); Comment, Automatic Stay
Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code:An Equitable Roadblock to Secured CreditorRelief, 17 San Diego
L. Rev. 1113 (1980). See also Miller, Bankruptcy Reform Act Bibliography, 85 Com. L.J. 373
(1980).
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of the stay is not to alter substantive rights of creditors, but merely to
stay the exercise of these rights.6
A knowledge of the workings of the automatic stay is essential for
persons concerned with enforcing a right against a debtor. On the positive
side, certain actions against a debtor are not stayed and may proceed.7
The collection of alimony and child support are examples of such actions.
On the other hand, the kinds of proceedings stayed are those which
creditors usually use to obtain satisfaction for a debt, such as phone calls,
demand letters, and filing of a suit. Employment of those kinds of procedures in violation of the stay could render both a creditor and the
creditor's attorney liable for contempt. 8
While it is true that courts do not hold parties in contempt for an
unknowing violation of the automatic stay,9 and it is rare that attorneys
knowingly proceed in the face of the stay, two untoward effects can result
from an attorney's lack of understanding of the workings of the stay. The
first is that attorneys conversant with the Bankruptcy Code can intimidate
creditors with the spectre of the contempt powers of the bankruptcy court.
Only someone who is familiar with the Code will know if such a threat
is a bluff. The second and more important result is that any action taken
in violation of the stay is void. ' 0 At the very least, it is important to avoid
wasting resources in taking action which at best has no effect.
Although one might assume that a debtor's attorney understands the
Bankruptcy Code, it is unfortunately not true that the filing of a bankruptcy
petition instills him or her with special knowlege of the Code. More and
more attorneys with a general practice are finding some of their clients
in need of the protection of the bankruptcy court. " To be of help to the
client-debtor, an attorney should know what actions are not stayed, in
order to be able to anticipate and plan for such eventualities. And of
6. See 11 U.S.C. §363 (Supp. V 1981) [the "Adequate Protection" provisions]; H.R. Rep. No.
595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-2 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49-51 (1978).
As a neat distinction, however, one might well ask whether a prohibition, however momentary in
the enforcement of a right, does not "affect" the right.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 2.
8. For a discussion of violation of the automatic stay, see infra text accompanying notes 105110.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 106-107.
10. See infra text accompanying note 105.
11. In the 12-month period ending March 31, 1982, 364,417 bankruptcy petitions and 127,118
adversary proceedings were filed nationwide. The pending bankruptcy case load rose to 677,460
estates, an increase of 20.9% over the previous 12-month period. Adversary proceedings rose 53.9%,
resulting in an all-time record of 91,007 adversary proceedings pending. In New Mexico during the
same period, 1329 voluntary petitions and 824 adversary proceedings were filed. Of the petitions,
1113 were in Chapter 7 (liquidation), 73 in Chapter 11 (business reorganization), and 143 in Chapter
13 (adjustment of debts). Administrative Office of the United States Courts Statistical Analysis and
Reports Division, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics for the Twelve Month Period Ending March
31, 1982, at 18, A-55, A-56, A-57.
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course, a clear understanding of what actions cannot be brought by creditors enables an attorney effectively to protect clients by enforcement of
the stay.
AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS OF THE CODE
The automatic stay goes into effect with the filing of the petition for
relief. The effective date and notice of the stay are included in the notice
of order for relief and order for creditors meeting sent by the clerk of
the court to all creditors scheduled by the debtor in the petition. "
The automatic stay affects all property of the estate that is created by
the commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Code. Property of
the estate receives an all-inclusive definition in the Code. 3 Even exempt
property comes into the estate, after which it can be exempted. 14 While
this article enumerates what makes up property of the estate, it should
be noted that there are intricacies which the court might have to consider
in determining exactly what is included in each category.15 For example,
whether a non-debtor's one-half interest in an airplane could be sold, or
whether it was property of the estate and thus subject to the automatic
stay, was only one of these kinds of issues decided by the New Mexico
Bankruptcy Court.16
Property of the estate includes all legal and equitable interests of the
debtor in all kinds of property, tangible and intangible, including causes
of action and property received by the trustee. Some examples of property
of the estate are medical insurance proceeds, 7 a liquor license, 8 and
rights created by a franchise agreement. 9 The debtor's legal interest must
be more than just naked title with no rights or obligations, however. A
joint tenancy executed for purposes of a will substitute will not be allowed
to be brought into the estate.20 There are two minor exceptions to the
12. The notice of the § 341 meeting sent by the clerk of the bankruptcy court to all creditors
scheduled by the debtor contains the following legend in bold type: "As a result of the filing of the
petitions, certain acts not proceeding against the debtor and his property are stayed as provided in
11 U.S.C. § 362(a)."
13. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (Supp. V 1981).
14. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 82-83 (1978). This is a change from pre-Code law.
15. What constitutes property of the estate is a question of federal law. In re Levy Ford, Jr., 3
Bankr. 559 (Bankr. D.Md. 1980) (en banc) (debtor's undivided interest in tenancy by the entirety
property under state law is property of the estate).
16. Bennett v. Aviation (In re Bennett), 22 Bankr. 3 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (non-debtor's onehalf undivided interest in an airplane coowned with debtor held not to be property of the estate and
not subject to the automatic stay).
17. In re Moskowitz, 13 Bankr. 357 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1981).
18. Matto's Inc. v. Olde Colonie Place (In re Matto's Inc.), 9 Bankr. 89 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1981).
19. Varisco v. Orowheat Food, Co. (In re Varisco), 16 Bankr. 634 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
20. Waldman v. Riley (In re Riley), 19 Bankr. 1017 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
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rights and obligations requirement: any power the debtor may exercise
solely for the benefit of another, and a spendthrift trust which has a
restriction on transfer enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law,
are not property of the estate. 2'
All interest of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property
is property of the estate. What is community property is governed by
state law, and if one spouse files a petition in bankruptcy the Code reaches
all of that community property.2" Although the commencement of a joint
case creates two estates, each estate consists of virtually all community
property of the joint debtor's spouse.2 3 Thus, in a marriage in which most
of the property is community property, couples usually file a joint petition
so that the community, while losing all of its property to the estate, can
at least benefit from the protections of the Code.24
If the debtor receives within 180 days after filing a petition any property
by bequest, devise, inheritance, as a result of a property settlement, or
as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy, that property becomes property
of the estate.25 The estate also includes any proceeds, products, rents, or
profits from the property of the estate, except for earnings of the individual
debtor accruing after the filing of the petition. 26 Any interest in property
the estate acquires after the commencement of the case, such as a contract,
goes into the estate. 27 Only those interests which the debtor might have
had in any such property pass to the estate, 28 regardless of any bankruptcy
forfeiture provisions in a contract. 29 Property of the estate also includes
any property which comes into the estate through the trustee's broad
avoiding powers, for example, any preferential transfers returned to the
estate.30
A right of redemption is clearly property of the estate but is an item
of property which is not affected by section 362 if the redemption period
has not begun to run at the time the debtor filed the petition. In Harris
v. American Bank of Commerce (In re Harris),' the court found that a
right of redemption which had not expired by the time the petition was
21. 11 U.S.C. §541(c)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
22. Id. §541(a)(2).
23. Ageton v. Cervenka (In re Ageton), 14 Bankr. 833 (9th Cir. 1981).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. V 1981). Assuming no separate property, all of the community
property is property of the estate and available to pay claims of creditors. If only one spouse files,
only one exemption will be granted; but if both file, the other spouse can claim a second set of
exemptions.
25. 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
26. Id. §541(a)(6).
27. Id. § 541(a)(7).
28. Id. Historical and Revision Notes: Legislative Statements.
29. Id. § 541(c)(1)(B).
30. Id. § 547(b).
31. No 81-0464J (Bankr. D.N.M. Nov. 30, 1981) (unreported), appeal docketed, Civ. No. 820026C (D.N.M. Dec. 8, 1981).
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filed was not stayed. The limited sixty-day extension of time under section
108 of the Code had expired, and the court held that the particular statecould not have its
created property right, containing its own 3limitation,
2
stay.
automatic
the
by
extended
expiration
The heart of the automatic stay provisions is contained in 11 U.S.C.
§362(a) (Supp. V 1981). 3 That section sets out the actions stayed by the
filing of the petition in a voluntary case or the order for relief in an
involuntary case.
Subsection (1) is a broad section that stays the commencement or the
continuation of all litigation against the debtor which was or could have
been brought before the filing of the petition or which could be brought
to recover on any prepetition claim against the debtor. All such proceedings are stayed, including less formal kinds of actions such as arbitration.
Except for criminal proceedings, the stay halts any ongoing litigation in
any other court, state or federal, no matter what the stage of the proceedings. In order for the proceedings to continue, the litigant must obtain
relief from the stay in the bankruptcy court. 34
Subsection (2) stays the enforcement of a judgment against the debtor
or against the property of the estate. The purpose of this subsection is to
prevent the issuance of a writ of execution on behalf of a judgment
creditor, and it stays the enforcement of a judgment obtained before the
filing of the petition. This section also stays attempts at enforcement after
the debtor has received a discharge.35
Subsection (3) stays acts to obtain possession of property of the estate
or from the estate. Property of the estate includes property in the possession of the estate such as leased property. Thus, a debtor's right to
possession of leased premises is property of the estate and protected by
the automatic stay.36
Subsection (4) stays any act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against
property of the estate, for example, by possession or process, because
such an act could change the status of a creditor from secured to unse32. See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (property rights which form the estate
are defined by state law); Trigg v. United States (In re Trigg), 630 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1980) (the
automatic stay under the Bankruptcy Act does not stop the automatic termination of oil and gas
leases). But see Jenkins v. Peet (In re Jenkins) 19 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. D.Colo. 1982).
33. See supra note 2 for the text of § 362(a).
34. 11 U.S.C. §362(d) (Supp.V 1981).
35. See Newton v. Ahern & Montgomery, (In re Newton), No. 78-1044C-1, 78-1045C-1 (Bankr.
D.N.M. July 20, 1981) (unreported), affd, No. 81-0941 HB (D.N.M. Jan. 27, 1982) (unreported)
(creditor and creditor's attorney held liable for attorney fees and punitive damages for postdischarge
attempts at enforcement of a judgment by writ of execution). Although the court decided Newton
under the former Bankruptcy Act, its reasoning is still applicable under the Code.
36. Pickus v. Vitagliano (In re Pickus), 8 Bankr. 114 (Bankr. D.Conn. 1980) (Code stays eviction
of tenants from leased premises).
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cured. 37 This subsection also stays foreclosure and self-help remedies. 38
It dovetails with section 362(c)(2) regarding the duration of the stay as
to property of the debtor. 9
Subsection (6) stays any act to collect, recover, or assess a claim against
the debtor that arose before the filing of the petition. The emphasis in
this section is on any act, Congress having adopted this broad language
to prevent the harassment of debtors by creditors in any way. 4°
Subsection (7) stays the set-off of any prepetition debt owed by the
debtor to the creditor. Legislative history indicates that the rights of the
creditors are not affected, merely stayed.4" A practical problem arises,
however, where a bank wishes to freeze a debtor's account for the purpose
of set-off.4 2 One bankruptcy court ruled that the bank is entitled to freeze
the account, but it must have the stay lifted before it can exercise its right
to set-off.43 Finally, subsection (8), new under the Code, stays the commencement or continuance of a proceeding before the United States Tax
Court concerning the debtor.

ACTIONS NOT STAYED BY THE AUTOMATIC STAY
While section 362(b)" enumerates actions not stayed by the automatic
stay, it should not be assumed that these kinds of acts always should
proceed. Rather, just as the court can grant relief from the stay for actions
37. But see 11 U.S.C. §546(b) (Supp. V 1-981), which allows a creditor to perfect by timely
notice against the trustee if the right could .be perfected by seizure or commencement of action. See,
e.g., In re Fiorillo, 19 Bankr. 21 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1982) (court permitted creditor to perfect a
mechanic's lien after the petition was filed).
38. 2 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 362-1, at 362-3 (15th ed. 1979). Subsecton (5) stays
any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the debtor to the extent it secures
a prepetition claim. Property of the debtor would include exempt property and most property acquired
after the filing of the petition. Its purpose is to prevent preferential treatment of certain creditors
and interference with the debtor's discharge. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 340-42
(1977).
39. The stay is in effect until the case is closed or dismissed or a discharge is granted. 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(c)(2) (Supp. V 1981); Bundy v. Bank of New Mexico (In re Bundy), No. 81-0045 (Bankr.
D.N.M. July 30, 1981) (unreported), aft'd, No. 81-0880 M (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1981) (unreported).
40. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 340-42 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 49-51 (1978).
41. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 340-42 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 49-51 (1978).
42. For pertinent Code sections on setoff, see 11 U.S.C. §§553, 542(b) (Supp. V 1981).
43. Third Nat'l Bank v. Carpenter (In re Carpenter), 14 Bankr. 405 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
But cf. Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank (In re Kenney's Franchise Corp.), 12
Bankr. 390 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981), for a holding that a freeze of a checking account in a Chapter
11 case violated the stay.
44. See supra note 2 for the text of section 362(b).
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stayed,45 so also can it stay matters not automatically stayed.46 These
sections permit the court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
acts which section 362 of the Code allows to proceed, but which could
harm the estate, should be stayed. However, it must be emphasized that
these acts are not affected by the automatic stay, and thus without intervention by the court will proceed without regard to the bankruptcy.
Although not specifically treated in section 362(b), the New Mexico
Bankruptcy Court has held that it does not have jurisdiction to grant
petitioners a divorce and that a divorce proceeding initiated by a debtor
after filing a joint petition in bankruptcy was not stayed by the automatic
stay.47 Other courts have decided this issue in the same way but with a
different rationale. These courts have relied on abstention under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471(d),48 on the theory that domestic relations are traditionally state
court matters and should be left to the state . 49 Other reasoning has been
that although under its broad jurisdictional grant the bankruptcy court
would have jurisdiction, there is not a sufficient nexus between the divorce
action and the bankruptcy case to justify the exercise of bankruptcy
jurisdiction." The bankruptcy court may, of course, have an interest in
the property settlement to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy court's power
by an improper characterization by counsel or the state court that the
payment was alimony and therefore not dischargeable or that it was a
property settlement and therefore dischargeable."
Subsection (1) of section 362(b) excepts from the stay commencement
or continuation of criminal action or proceedings against a debtor. While
most criminal proceedings clearly come within this exception, others are
merely disguised debt collection. The issue arises both if an individual
5 2
is empowered to swear out warrants and if the state brings the action.
Where an aggrieved party is empowered by statute to have a criminal
complaint issued against another party, the bankruptcy court must decide
whether the creditor is using the criminal process to exact a preference
or circumvent a discharge and thus thwart the policy of the Bankruptcy
45. Holtkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp), 669 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982) (relief from the stay
granted to allow a personal injury suit to proceed, the court reasoning that it was not restricted to
situations specifically exempted in the statute in allowing such relief).
46. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (Supp. V 1981), which permits the bankruptcy court to issue any order,
process, or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of the Code.
47. Cunningham v. Cunningham (In re Cunningham), 9 Bankr. 7 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (Supp. V 1981).
49. Chrystler v. Heslar (In re Heslar) 16 Bankr. 329 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981).
50. 1 W. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 3.01, at 3-46 (15th ed. 1979).
51. Dirks v. Dirks (In re Dirks), 15 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (payments due to third
parties in lieu of alimony are dischargeable); In re Danley, 14 Bankr.,493 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 8,
1981) (debtor filed bankruptcy and discharged debts he assumed as-a settlement in a divorce action).
52. See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-36-9 (Repl. Pamp. 1980) ("Citizen's complaint"), which
appears to allow a private citizen to bring a criminal complaint, and N.M. Stat. Ann. § 33-36-1
(Repl. Pamp. 1980), which is New Mexico's worthless check law.
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Code. The better reasoning in cases such as these supports a decision
which does not exclude disguised debt collection from the automatic
stay. 3
As with many of the issues faced by bankruptcy courts, questions of
comity as well as provisions of the Code itself restrain the bankruptcy
judge from interfering with state court proceedings. For example, the
Code prohibits a bankruptcy judge from enjoining another court, 5 4 although the All Writs Statute gives the court power to enjoin individuals
and issue injunctions.55 Undoubtedly any state action which has as its
genuine objective the swift punishment of an infraction of a state statute
prohibiting the issuance of worthless checks is entirely proper, at least
where there is no express or implied arrangement under which, if restitution is made, the criminal charge is dropped. Such cases undoubtedly
will be permitted to proceed. As always, it may be considerably more
difficult to classify some particular activity than the easy legal rationale
suggests. It may be possible to get some collection activity by, but not
too much.5 6 The fresh start objectives of the Code would seem to militate
in favor of not allowing state court criminal laws which are in reality
statutes enacted for the benefit of creditors to frustrate the purpose of the
Code.
Subsection (2) allows collection of alimony, maintenance, and support
from property which is not property of the estate. Thus, most property
acquired after the commencement of a liquidation case, any other property
which does not pass to the estate, and exempt property are available for
these payments as far as bankruptcy law is concerned. 5 7 Because alimony,
maintenance, and child support are excepted from discharge," 8 it would
be inconsistent with this policy decision to stay collection of these obligations.
Subsection (3) does not stay postpetition perfection of certain liens.
This subsection dovetails with section 546(b) which allows a creditor to
perfect certain liens if such perfection is allowed by applicable law.5 9
Subsection (4) allows the commencement or continuation of an action
or a proceeding of a governmental unit to invoke its police or regulatory
53. Bray v. Holley (In re Bray), 12 Bankr. 359 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. -1981); In re Ca-dwell, 5
Bankr. 740 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980). In both cases creditors were enjoined from using the criminal
process to collect on claims.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). It is questionable whether this statute still applies to the bankruptcy
U.S. -,
102 S.
court after Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., Ct. 2858 (1982). See N.M. Fed. Dist. Ct. R. 31 (as amended).
56. How much is too much is beyond the scope of this article.
57. il U.S.C. §522(c)(1) (Supp. V 1981), allows exempt property to be used to pay alimony
and certain taxes.
58. Id. § 523(a)(5).
59. E.g., Uniform Commercial Code; H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 371 (1977).
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power, and subsection (5) allows the enforcement of a judgment, other
than a money judgment, obtained in such an action. These exceptions
allow actions such as injunctions to enforce environmental regulations.
Courts usually construe these sections narrowly, requiring the action taken
to relate to public health and safety. 6" The New Mexico Bankruptcy Court
held that an Indian tribe was not a governmental entity for the purposes
of this subsection and thus its actions were not exempted from the stay.6
In another example, state law suspending a driver's license until the
licensee posts financial security for damages from an automobile accident
was found to serve a particular class of creditors rather than the broad
public interest, and the court did not except its enforcement from the
stay.6 2 Thus, courts hold that if the focus of the state's regulatory power
is directed at the debtor's financial obligations rather than the state's
legitimate health and safety concerns, section 362(b)(4) does not apply
and courts do not except such actions from the stay.
The final three subsections of section 362(b) are narrow and have
limited application. Subsection (6) excepts from the stay the setoff of any
mutual debt and claims which are commodity transactions. Subsection
(7) allows actions by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust insured under the National Housing Act and covering five or more living units. Subsection (8) allows a
governmental unit to issue to the debtor a notice of a tax deficiency.
Following the course taken by a hypothetical Chapter 7 debtor might
help illustrate the workings of the stay. Assume that our debtor is a
divorced individual who has lost his full-time job, is only working halftime, and has fallen upon hard times. He was buying his house on a real
estate contract, but has not been able to make the payments in several
months. The house is structurally deteriorating and is in the path of a
new street. Debtor recently was involved in an automobile accident and
was cited for driving while intoxicated. As a result of that accident, his
car struck and killed a pedestrian, whose survivors have decided to sue
him. Among other debts, Debtor has borrowed from a bank to buy a car,
giving the car as collateral for the loan, and he owes a department store
money on a charge account. All of his obligations are in arrears.
After proper counseling by a diligent attorney, 3 Debtor has decided to
file a Chapter 7 petition. Which of his creditors will be able to proceed
60. Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981) (Missouri's law
regulating grain warehouses was found to have as its primary purpose the protection of the pecuniary
interest in the property of the debtor, and as such was not excepted from the stay under § 362(b)(4)).
61. In re Sandmar Corp., 12 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
62. Muzio v. Samson (In re Samson), 17 Bankr. 528 (Bankr. D.Conn. 1982).
63. See 1 W. Norton, Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §§ 7.01 to 7.18 (1982), for a checklist
of factors to be covered by an attorney at the outset of undertaking a bankruptcy case.
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in an attempt to have their debts satisfied and which will be stayed?'
First of all, if Debtor is paying alimony as a result of his divorce
settlement, he must continue to pay. The state may institute any criminal
proceedings which could be brought as a result of his drunken driving
because commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings are not
stayed. However, any civil proceedings in wrongful death brought by the
survivors of the accident victim may not proceed. Relief from the stay
must be sought in the bankruptcy court in order to initiate or proceed
with such a suit in state court. If the suit is in progress in state court, the
plaintiff could remove the case to the bankruptcy court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 147865 or request relief from the stay to proceed in state court. If the
suit has proceeded to judgment in state court, but the judgment has not
yet been entered by the court, relief from the stay must be obtained so
that the judgment can be entered.
Assuming Debtor has not made his loan payments for his automobile,
the bank cannot make demand on Debtor or attempt to repossess the car.
The bank must first seek relief from the stay in order to do so. The bank
will even be in violation of the stay if it calls or sends dunning letters to
Debtor. Likewise, the unsecured department store cannot take steps to
enforce payment on the account. The store can revoke Debtor's charging
privileges, however, because such an act is not an attempt to obtain
payment for prepetition debts. If the creditor has a judgment and wishes
to execute on Debtor's property or garnish his wages, it mustfirst obtain
relief from the stay. The payee on the real estate contract may not send
a demand letter and may not accelerate on the note without relief from
the stay. The city can initiate condemnation proceedings and enforce a
judgment pursuant to such proceedings. It must be obvious thatpractically
any action which a creditor might want to take can only proceed after
relief from the stay has been granted. The exceptions to the stay are
narrow and specific.
DURATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Any act against property of the estate is stayed until the property is no
longer property of the estate' and until it is no longer property of the
debtor.6 7 Section 362(c) 68 of the Code delineates the duration of this
64. Support for all of the actions which may and may not be taken in this hypothetical case can
be found in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) & (b) (Supp. V 1981), which previously have been discussed supra
at text accompanying notes 12-62.
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1478 (Supp. V 1981).
66. See 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(1), (4) (Supp. V 1981).

67. Id. §362(a)(5).
68. See supra note 2 for the text of § 362(c).
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protection of property both of the estate and of the debtor. The legislative
history clarifies this section to mean that the stay of an act against the
property of the estate ceases when that property ceases to be property of
the estate.69 Even so, when that property then becomes property of the
debtor, for example, by abandonment, the stay under section 362(a)(5)
comes into play. The stay of an act against the property of a debtor, then,
is terminated only by the end of the bankruptcy by closing, dismissal,
or discharge.7° Thus, if the property is exempted or abandoned by the
trustee to the debtor, it is still subject to the stay. 7
RELIEF FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Upon the filing of a complaint for relief from the stay and the payment
of a filing fee,72 an expedited hearing will be held. As a practical matter,
a complaint is always initiated by a secured creditor who fears that the
secured collateral is diminishing in value, usually because the debtor is
failing to make payments as they become due. There may be, however,
occasional situations where an unsecured creditor will have a legitimate
claim for relief from the stay. For example, a court will undoubtedly
grant such relief to a tort claimant who asserts a claim for damages arising
from an automobile accident, so long as the claim is within the limits of
any applicable insurance policy and there is no claim for punitive damages, which no insurance policy covers. The suit thus framed will not
have any impact upon the bankruptcy estate. But if the damage claim
exceeds the policy limits, or includes a demand for punitive damages,
the impact upon the bankruptcy estate (including, of course, the fees of
an attorney to defend what is not covered by the policy), may well result
in a continuation of the stay by the bankruptcy court.
Although the statutory language provides for relief on "request of a
party," a request has been thought to mean a complaint rather than a
motion because Bankruptcy Rule 701, denominating which matters shall
be decided in an adversary proceeding, includes a proceeding to obtain
69. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 343 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 52 (1978).
70. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 343 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 52 (1978).
71. H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 343 (1977); S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 52 (1978). See also Bundy v. Bank of New Mexico (In re Bundy) No. 81-0045 (Bankr.
D.N.M. July 30, 1981) (unreported), affid, No. 81-0880 M (D.N.M. Dec. 29, 1981) (unreported).
In Bundy, the court entered an order of abandonment, but held that the stay continued as a stay
applicable to property of the debtor, even though the stay applicable to property of the estate had
terminated. See also In re Cruseturner, 8 Bankr. 581 (Bankr. D.Utah 1981).
72. At this time the filing fee under Chapter 7 is $60, and the filing fee under Chapter 11 is
$200. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a) (Supp. V 1981).
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relief from a stay.73 At the expedited hearing,74 the court will only hear
matters relating to the lifting of the stay and adequate protection. It will
not hear issues extraneous to the lifting of the stay raised by counterclaim,
crossclaim, third party complaint, or otherwise. The crowded dockets of
bankruptcy courts simply do not permit full scale hearings on all issues
to be expedited. Such claims are dismissed without prejudice from the
stay proceeding and may be raised separately in another proceeding.75
There are some situations where this bifurcation can create considerable
problems. For example, where the debtor's defense to the creditor's claim
also can establish a counterclaim, the bankruptcy judge may permit full
litigation of the counterclaim at the hearing on the complaint for relief
from stay. But if the damage issue on the counterclaim promises to become
lengthy, it may well be severed for convenience and tried another day.
In a court where there may be from ten to fifty complaints for stay pending
at any given time, the requirement of a hearing within thirty days from
the date of filing would impose excessive burdens upon the time of the
court if severance were not possible.
Because section 362(e) allows the stay to terminate automatically thirty
days after the complaint is filed, the court must hold a hearing within
that time. The statute requires notice and a hearing. Whenever that language is used, however, reference must be made to 11 U.S.C. § 102(1)
(Supp. V 1981), which explains that notice means "such notice as is
appropriate in the particular circumstance," and defines a hearing as "such
opportunity for a hearing as is appropriate in the particular circumstance."
The subsection goes on to authorize action without a hearing in emergency
situations. However, a hearing is virtually always held after notice to
appropriate parties, that is, anyone whose rights might be affected by
relief from the stay.
76
Because the stay automatically terminates unless a hearing is held,
stay complaints have priority on the court's calendar. In a complex case,
the Code allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing at which it can
77
continue the stay if it is likely the debtor will prevail at the final hearing.
In that case,
the final hearing must begin thirty days after the preliminary
78
hearing.
73. But see Bankr. R. 4001 (proposed Mar. 1, 1982) (published by the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States), in which relief for a stay
is requested by motion.
74. See II U.S.C. § 362(e) (Supp. V 1981).
75. Wyatt v. Bennett (In re Bennett), 17 Bankr. 843 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982); Lekvold v. Henderson
(In re Lekvold), No. 81-01032 MA (Bankr. D.N.M. Mar. 30, 1982) (unreported).
76. 11 U.S.C. §362(e) (Supp. V 1981); Navajo Tribe v. Sandmar Corp. (In re Sandmar), 16
Bankr. 120 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
77. 11 U.S.C. §362(e)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
78. Id. § 362(e)(2).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

Interim Bankr R. 4001 as adopted by the local rules requires the final
order to be issued within thirty days of the final hearing. Therefore,
although the stay can terminate within thirty days if the complaint is not
heard, it is possible ninety days will elapse between the filing of the
complaint and the entry of the final order. The court could presumably
modify or alter that time limit. Ex parte relief is also available to an
interested party by showing that irreparable damage to its interest will
occur before there is an opportunity for notice and hearing. 7
If the stay automatically terminates, the court can reimpose it.8' It
would also be possible in a district such as New Mexico, where the
bankruptcy judges must travel the state to hold hearings, to have a preliminary telephone hearing within the first thirty-day period. The court
could make a preliminary determination at that time. Also, the court will
sometimes set stay hearings in Albuquerque for cases scheduled in Las
Cruces or Roswell so that the hearings will take place within thirty days.
This policy, however, conflicts with the theory behind having the court
available to the debtor so as to alleviate travel costs to the party in
bankruptcy.
ELEMENTS TO BE PROVED IN THE
HEARING FOR RELIEF FROM THE STAY
The hearing to request relief from the stay is a full-blown evidentiary
hearing with testimony and evidence offered by both parties. 8 The court
may grant relief from the stay by terminating, modifying, annulling, or
conditioning the stay.82 In fact, as a usual alternative to terminating the
stay, the court frequently will condition its continuation on payments to
be made by the debtor to the creditor.83
The Code requires the court to grant relief from the stay in two situations. First, for any act stayed under section 362(a), which includes both
acts against property and other kinds of acts, the court must grant relief
for "cause." The example of "cause" given in the statute is lack of
79. Id. §362(f).
80. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. V 1981). See supra note 2 for the text of the statute.
82. See N.M. Bankr. R. 1-114 ("Automatic Stay Litigation") for detailed pretrial and trial
procedure for stay litigation. The Local Rules Committee anticipated that the procedure set out
would expedite the hearing itself, which is already given an expedited docket placement. See 11

U.S.C. § 362(e) (Supp. V 1981).
83. See First Interstate Bank v. Becht (In re Becht), No. 81-0535 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 13, 1981)
(unreported), aftd, No. 81-1039JB (D.N.M.) (unreported), in which the court lifted the stay because
the debtor had not made the monthly payments on which its continuation depended; see also Hargis
v. Southwest Mineral Corp. (In re Hargis) No. 81-0538 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 21, 1981), appeal
docketed, No. 82-023SC (D.N.M.) (unreported) (stay continued so long as lease payments timely
made).
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adequate protection.84 Regarding a proceeding before another tribunal,
"cause" would include a determination by the bankruptcy judge that the
case should proceed in that other forum. Or the court could decide there
is not a sufficient nexus between the two proceedings. An example of
this latter act would be a stay of a child custody proceeding. As an
alternative to "cause," the Code requires that the court must lift the stay
of an act against property if the debtor has no equity in the property and
if the property is not necessary for an effective reorganization.8 5 In a
liquidation proceeding the latter requirement would not apply, and the
court would only have to find that there was no equity in the property.
The reference in section 362(d) to a lack of adequate protection relates
back to section 361,86 which sets out examples of three ways adequate
protection may be provided. The concept of adequate protection is derived
from the constitutional protection of property interests.87 The secured
creditor is guaranteed not to lose the benefit of its bargain; that is, it is
entitled to receive the payments owed or to repossess the collateral. In
reorganization proceedings under the Code, conflict can arise between a
creditor secured by property in the hands of the debtor, and the debtor
who must use that property for reorganization. The automatic stay can
impair the value of the creditor's lien. For example, if the lien is secured
by real property and the debtor has stopped making payments, the creditor
can be harmed if the debtor's equity in the property does not exceed the
value of the lien. Again, one in second position on a real estate contract
to which the debtor is obligated may be required to make the payments
to the senior lienholders in order to avoid default on the contract and a
loss of its interest. If the property is a kind which depreciates with use
or time (for example, a motor vehicle or heavy equipment), a halt in
payments almost surely leads to a loss in the value of the creditor's lien,
and if the creditor cannot quickly repossess, the value of the collateral
will be less than the value of the lien.
The Code suggests three methods of providing adequate protection
when necessary. These are nonexclusive examples of the substantial
equivalent of the secured creditor's bargain. 88 The first is to require the
trustee (or the debtor in possession) to make periodic cash payments to
the creditor to the extent that the stay results in a decrease in the value
of the creditor's interest in the property.8 9 For example, a court might
84. 11 U.S.C. §362(d)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
85. Id. § 362(d)(2).
86. See supra note 2 for the text of the statute.
87. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273 (1940) (the right of the debtor under the
Bankruptcy Act to redeem property does not conflict with a secured creditor's constitutional right
to have the value of the property protected during the proceedings).
88. 1 W. Norton, Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice §22.04 (1982).
89. 11 U.S.C. §361(1) (Supp. V 1981).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13

require the debtor in possession to make monthly payments on a vehicle
which would compensate the creditor for depreciation. It is important to
note that the measure of payment may not be in the amount of the contract
payment.'
The second method is to provide a replacement lien to the extent that
the stay results in a decrease in value of the creditor's interest. 91 This
can be done by marshalling assets, selling them, and having the lien
attach to the proceeds. It can also be done by having the debtor put up
additional security, for example, land, as security for accounts receivable
which may not be collectible.
The third method is to give the creditor what will result in the "indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the property. 9 This idea of indubitable equivalence came from Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Murel Holding Corp.93 Judge Hand reasoned that the
Bankruptcy Act would not deny a creditor his money or property without
providing him the indubitable equivalence . 94 It is difficult to determine
what this method suggested by the Code adds to the other two. In fact,
one court has seen it as redundant. 95 On the other hand, a creditor can
use this strong language to underscore that the United States Constitution
guarantees it will not lose the benefit of its bargain. The phrase can best
be appreciated for its marvelous vagueness, rather than its clarity or
usefulness.
Each of these three methods would assure that the creditor would not
lose ground as a result of the automatic stay. They provide a way for the
debtor to retain possession of the collateral while assuring the creditor
that the value of its lien will not be diminished.
The court must also lift the stay if the debtor does not have an equity
in the property and the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. Legislative history explains that these requirements in subsection
362(d) are to apply in situations where a debtor files a bankruptcy petition
on the eve of foreclosure. 96 This subsection does not apply, however, if
the debtor is leasing or managing the real property as a part of a business,
such as a hotel operation. 97 In that situation, the debtor would have no
equity in the property, but the property would be necessary to an effective
90. ABD Federal Credit Union v. Wilfians (In re Williams), 6 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1980) (debtor required to make payments to creditor to compensate for a decline in value of vehicle).
91. 11 U.S.C. §361(2) (Supp. V 1981).
92. Id. § 361(3).
93. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935).
94. Id. at 942.
95. Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Alyucan Interstate Corp. (In re Alyucan Interstate Corp.), 12 Bankr.
803 (Bankr. D.Utah 1981).
96. See 124 Cong. Rec. 32,350 (1978).
97. Id.
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reorganization. On the other hand, where the debtor owns hotel property,
both requirements would still need to be proved. 98
The Code establishes the burden of proof, requiring the moving party
to prove the debtor's lack of equity in the property99 and the opposing
party to carry the burden of proof on all other issues. 100
As an example,
a creditor requesting relief from the stay in order to foreclose on a parcel
of real property must prove that the amount of its lien and any other prior
liens exceeds the value of the property."° The creditor will do this by
proof of the debt and expert appraisal testimony of the value of the
property. This showing is crucial because it is an element which must be
proved under section 362(d)(2), and because it is the basis of the cause
for which the stay can be lifted under section 362(d)(1). Because expert
witnesses are usually needed to present this information, Local Bankruptcy Rule 1-114 has been adopted to require disclosure before trial of
essential matters which the shortness of time between filing and trial
would make difficult to obtain by usual discovery tools.
REMOVAL OF STATE AND
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT PROCEDURES
Because all proceedings in other courts are stayed with the filing of
the petition, the creditor must take affirmative action in order to allow
those proceedings to go forward. A creditor can request relief from the
stay to allow a proceeding under way in state or federal district court to
go forward, or the case can be removed to the bankruptcy court. A case
that is removed does not get any particular priority on the bankruptcy
court's docket and, depending on the extent of the proceedings in the
original court, removal could delay matters. A case removed on the eve
of trial will not proceed to trial immediately in the bankruptcy court. On
the other hand, any ruling which already has been made by a state or
federal district judge is likely to stand in the bankruptcy court. Although
the bankruptcy court could decide matters differently from other courts
or change decisions made in those courts, it rarely will do so, for reasons
of comity and judicial economy, and to discourage forum shopping.
Therefore, a removal to bankruptcy court in order to get a "second
98. See, e.g., Bankers Union Life v. Amlani Enterprises (In re Amlani), No. 82-0396R, (Bankr.
D.N.M. July 20, 1982) (unreported), where the debtor owned a motel necessary to the reorganization.
The creditor met the burden of proving that the debtor had no equity in the property, and the court
lifted the stay.
99. 11 U.S.C. §362(g)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
100. 11 U.S.C. §362(g)(2) (Supp. V 1981). Usually the opposing party will be the debtor,
although it could be another creditor.
101. La Jolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Associates, 18 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1982) (junior lien on real property should not be counted in determining whether creditor is adequately
protected by an equity cushion).
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opinion" after an oral decision has been announced by the trial judge at
the close of a hearing but before the ruling is reduced to writing, will be
met with cheerful disfavor.
Presently there is no specified time within which a case should be
removed."°2 If a time limit for removal should be imposed, it will relate
to the time of the filing of the petition for relief. It is important to note
that the "petition for relief" is the petition filed in the bankruptcy court
which begins the proceedings, and not the discharge. At any rate, the
New Mexico Bankruptcy Court has adopted the rule, set out by United
States District Judge Rogers in Patterson v. Refinery Engineering Co., "3
that jurisdiction of the removed case attaches when the application for
removal is filed in the bankruptcy court. 104
VIOLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY
At the very least, actions taken in violation of the automatic stay are
void."0 5 Further, one who intentionally violates the stay can be held in
contempt of court. o6 While it is agreed that one who has no actual notice
of the stay cannot be held in contempt, such notice does not have to be
formal notice. An entity who "heard of" the filing of the bankruptcy
actual knowledge but not formal notice, has
petition, that is, who had
07
1
contempt.
in
held
been
Intentional violations of the stay are dealt with seriously, as they should
be. In Georgia, a debtor lost his job as a result of a garnishment of wages
instituted by a creditor. The judge ordered the creditor to pay the debtor
$5,000 in damages for loss of employment, plus $500 in attorneys fees
and costs.' 0 8
Some creditors become creative in their stay violations, without realizing the gravity of their acts. A creditor who obtained the key to a
restaurant sold to the debtor removed rotting food from the restaurant
and dumped it onto the debtor's yard. The court held the creditor in civil
102. The local rules for the New Mexico Bankruptcy Courts have eliminated the time requirements
in which a case must be removed. Bankr. R. 9027 (proposed Mar. 1, 1982) (published by the
Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States), does
however set a time limit of 30, 90, or 180 days, depending on the circumstances of the case.
103. 183 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.M. 1960).
104. Frontier Leasing v. CFB, Inc. (In re CFB, Inc.), No. 80-0018 (Bankr. D.N.M. Nov. 30,
1981) (unreported) (the court found the untimely removal of a state court case not to be jurisdictional).
105. Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 443 (1940); Zestee Foods, Inc. v. Phillips Foods Corp.,
536 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1976); Meyer v. Rowen, 181 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1950).
106. Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, 550 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1093 (1977) (fine upheld against counsel for contractors who sued in state court to foreclose
mechanics' liens with knowledge of bankruptcy); 2 W. M. Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 362.11,
at 326-58 (15th ed. 1979).
107. In re Sandmar, 12 Bankr. 910 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981).
108. In re Batla, 12 Bankr. 397 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981).
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contempt and ordered him to pay the debtor $500 in damages and $300
in costs." It is worth emphasizing that an attorney may incur personal
liability for such violations. "10
OTHER INJUNCTIONS
The Code empowers the bankruptcy court to issue any order, process,
or judgment necessary to carry out the provisions of the Code. " Therefore, the court can issue injunctions and stay matters over and above
those automatically stayed in section 362. The New Mexico Bankruptcy
Court has stayed court action to foreclose a note on which a debtor was
jointly and severally liable but not named as a defendant. The court
enjoined the creditor from proceeding in state court because that court's
decision would bind the debtor and affect future bankruptcy court proceedings. "2 The court cited a previous New Mexico Bankruptcy Court
decision holding that a state court judgment accelerating the unpaid bal3
ance of a note has a res judicata effect on the bankruptcy court."
The bankruptcy court can also issue writs of execution to enforce its
5
judgments. 4 In addition, the court is included in the All Writs Statute,"'
which empowers it to issue all writs necessary to implement its jurisdiction. The bankruptcy court possesses all the powers of a court of equity,
law, and admiralty. 116 Its powers are limited from enjoining another court
or punishing a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the
judge or warranting a punishment of imprisonment." 7 The federal rule
of civil procedure dealing with injunctions also applies to the bankruptcy
court." 8 A debtor could invoke this rule to reimpose a stay which has
automatically terminated.''9 Any of these powers could be used if the
stay of any action would benefit creditors and the estate.
109. In re Reed, 11 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. D.Utah 1981).
110. See supra note 35.
111. 11 U.S.C. §105 (Supp. V 1981).
112. New Mexico Properties v. Commerce Bank & Trust, No. 81-0578 (Bankr. D.N.M. Nov.
9, 1981) (unreported).
113. Romero v. Montoya (In re Montoya), No. 81-0412 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 12, 1981) (unreported).
114. Bankr. R. 769.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1976). But see supra note 55.
116. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (Supp. V 1981).
117. Id. It is the contention of Glenn Keller, an eminent former Colorado bankruptcy judge, and
it appears to comport with the reading of this statute, that the bankruptcy court can imprison for
civil contempt. For a good example of the confusion between civil and criminal contempt, see
Niemyjski v. Niemyjski, 98 N.M. 176, 646 P.2d 1240 (1982). For further discussion of this case,
see Kelsey & Siegel, Domestic Relations, Survey of New Mexico Law: 1981-1982, 13 N.M.L. Rev.
379 (1983).
118. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.
119. Navajo Tribe v. Sandmar (In re Sandmar), 16 Bankr. 120 (D.N.M. 1981).
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In addition to the stay provisions of the Code and the affirmative powers
of the bankruptcy court, a discharge of the debtor operates as an injunction
against any act to collect, recover, or offset any discharged debt as a
personal liability of the debtor. 2 ° The discharge extinguishes the obligation of the debtor to repay the debt.121 Thus a creditor who attempts
to collect a debt which has been discharged will be subject to the same
sanctions which could be imposed for violation of the automatic stay. 22
STAY OF ACTION AGAINST A CODEBTOR

In a Chapter 13 proceeding, section 1301123 stays actions against a
codebtor to collect a consumer debt. The creditor's rights are not lost,
merely stayed. If a debtor's Chapter 13 plan does not provide for payments
to the creditor (or for repayment in full), the creditor can seek relief from
the stay to collect from the codebtor. This would also be true if the debtor
defaults on payments under the plan. 124 This stay does not apply to a debt
incurred in the ordinary course of the debtor's business,125 or if the Chapter
12 6
13 case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a Chapter 7 or 11 case.
120. 11 U.S.C. §524(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
121. Of course, where a debt is secured by collateral, the discharge extinguishes the debtor's
personal obligation but the collateral must revert to the secured party. Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir.
, 103 S. Ct. 407 (1982).
1981), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Security Indus. Bank,__ U.S. 122. See Newton v. Ahern & Montgomery, (In re Newton), No. 78-1044C-1, 78-1045C-1 (Bankr.
D.N.M. July 20, 1981) (unreported), aff'd, 81-0941 HB (D.N.M. Jan. 27, 1982) (unreported).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (Supp. V 1981) provides as follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order
for relief under this chapter [11 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq.], a creditor may not
act, or commence or continue any civil action, to collect all or any part of a
consumer debt of the debtor from any individual that is liable on such debt
with the debtor, or that secured such debt, unless(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordinary
course of such individual's business; or
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7
or 11 of this title [11 U.S.C. §§701 et seq. or 1101 et seq.].
(b) A creditor may present a negotiable instrument, and may give notice of
dishonor of such an instrument.
(c) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court
shall grant relief from the stay provided by subsection (a) of this section with
respect to a creditor, to the extent that(1) as between the debtor and the individual protected under subsection
(a)of this section, such individual received the consideration for the claim
held by such creditor;
(2) the plan filed by the debtor proposes not to pay such claim; or
(3) such creditor's interest would be irreparably harmed by such stay.
124. S. Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 138 (1978).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
126. Id. § 1301(a)(2).
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Excepted from this stay is the right of the creditor to present a negotiable
instrument and to give notice of dishonor.'27 The Code also protects the
creditor from irreparable harm by requiring the court to lift the stay if
necessary to protect the creditor's interest, that is, if it appears the codebtor might become unable to meet the obligation.' 28
EXTENSIONS OF TIME
While section 108129 of the Code is not really a stay provision of the
kind previously discussed, it is in essence a stay or extension of the
running of time periods in which to commence a legal action. The first
subsection 3 ° extends the time period in which an action may be commenced by the trustee (or the debtor in possession by virtue of section
1107), to the longer of two years after the order of relief or the end of
the relevant period. Thus, if a statute of limitations would ordinarily run
shortly after the order of relief (the filing of the petition in a voluntary
127. Id. § 1301(b).
128. Id. § 1301(c)(3).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 108 (Supp. V 1981) reads as follows:
(a) If applicable law, an order entered in a proceeding, or an agreement fixes
a period within which the debtor may commence an action, and such period
has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may
commence such action only before the later of(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; and
(2) two years after the order for relief.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, if applicable law, an
order entered in a proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the
debtor or an individual protected under section 1301 of this title [II U.S.C.
§ 13011 may file any pleading, demand, notice, or proof of claim or loss, cure
a default, or perform any other similar act, and such period has not expired
before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may only file, cure, or
perform, as the case may be, before the later of(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; and
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title [11 U.S.C. § 524], if applicable law, an order entered in a proceeding or an agreement fixes a period
for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy
court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with respect to
which such individual is protected under section 1301 of this title [11 U.S.C.
§ 1301], and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the
petition, then such period does not expire until the later of(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; and
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under
section 362, 722, or 1301 of this title III U.S.C. §§ 362, 722, or 1301),
as the case may be, with respect to such claim.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 108(a)(Supp. V 1981).
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proceeding), it will be extended by this section. The second subsection"'
extends to the later of sixty days after the order for relief or the expiration
of the right, other action which the debtor could take under the applicable
law, order, or agreement, such as filing a pleading, giving notice, or
curing a default. Thus, under a contract, the right of redemption or the
right to cure a default, if it has not run, will be extended for sixty days.
But if such a right has been terminated, neither this section nor section
362(a) will revive the right. 132
The final subsection' 33 extends the statute of limitations for a creditor
for thirty days after the expiration of the stay under section 362 (automatic
stay), section 722 (redemption), and section 1301 (stay of action against
a codebtor) of the Code. As with the rest of section 108, this subsection
extends the statute of limitations only if it did not expire prior to the
filing of the petition.
APPENDIX*
PRELIMINARY AUTOMATIC STAY CHECKLIST
ACTIONS STAYED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Proceedings to recover a prepetition claim against the debtor.
Enforcement of a prepetition judgment.
Any act to obtain estate property.
Any act to perfect or enforce a lien against the estate.
Any act to create, perfect, or enforce a lien against property of the
debtor securing a prepetition claim.
6. Any act to collect, assess, or recover a prepetition claim against the
debtor.
7. Any United States Tax Court proceeding.
8. The setoff of a prepetition debt.
ACTIONS NOT STAYED
1. Criminal proceedings.

131. Id.§ 108(b).
132. Trigg v. United States (In re Trigg), 630 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1980). This case reinforces
the concept that § 362 stays acts against property. The running of a right of redemption is not an
act. In Harris v. American Bank of Commerce (In re Harris), 81-0464J (Bankr. D.N.M. Nov. 30,
1981) (unreported), appeal docketed, Civ. No. 82-0026C (D.N.M. Dec. 8, 1981), the court held
that the stay did not stay the running of the right of redemption in a mortgage foreclosure where
the right had not yet expired at the filing of the petition.
133. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (Supp. V 1981).
*This checklist is provided only as a means of alerting the attorney into which category a specific
act might fall. Careful examination of the Bankruptcy Code is always necessary.
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2. Collections of alimony, maintenance, and support from non-estate
property.
3. An act to perfect any interest in property against the trustee as allowed
by the Code.
4. Proceedings to enforce governmental police power.
5. Enforcement of governmental police power (but not a money judgment).
6. Setoff of mutual debts in commodities transactions.
7. Certain HUD foreclosures.
8. Issuance of a notice of tax deficiency.

